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Abstract 
This study uses a new measure of board reputation that is based on the market value of 
other companies on which board members serve, and examines whether board reputation has a 
causal effect on monitoring as reflected in financial statement reporting quality. A negative 
causal effect is expected if reputable directors are ineffective monitors because they are too busy 
or they choose to cater to management, whereas a positive causal effect is expected if reputable 
directors are more experienced and subject to significant reputation penalties in the case of a 
financial reporting failure. An alternative explanation is that reputation does not affect financial 
reporting quality, but rather is a characteristic of the market for directorship, where the 
equilibrium relation between reputation and financial reporting quality is determined by the 
demand for and supply of reputable directors. Our results suggest that financial reporting quality 
is not an important determinant of the market for directorship. Rather, we document that 
reputation has a positive causal effect on monitoring and results in higher quality financial 
reporting.  
 
JEL Classification: G34 M41 M51 
 
Keywords: Reputation; Directors; Financial reporting quality; Monitoring 
 
 
 
* Rubin is from Simon Fraser University and IDC (arubin@sfu.ca). Segal is from IDC (dsegal@idc.ac.il).  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
On March 12, 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported the appointment of Jerry Grundhofer, 
former chief executive of U.S. Bancorp, as an independent director at Citigroup. 1 The Journal 
stated that this change followed months of pressure from federal officials and was part of a deal 
that would include an increase in the government's stake in the bank. Importantly, Mr. 
Grundhofer was not expected to resign from his directorship at Ecolab, a Minnesota-based public 
company with a market capital of $11 billion; rather, Mr. Grundhofer would serve as a director 
on both boards. Mr. Grundhofer’s appointment reflects the increasingly popular notion amongst 
investors and regulators that the appointment of “Superstar” independent directors can benefit 
companies because of their experience as internal decision makers. 
Despite the logical appeal of the argument that board-sitting experience may be of value to 
companies, the academic literature has questioned whether such experience can provide value to 
firms and shareholders. The controversy centers not on whether multi-board sitting is beneficial, 
but rather on whether it harms firm performance. For instance, while Ferris et al. (2003) argue 
that sitting on multiple boards is not associated with reduced monitoring, Fitch and Shivdasani 
(2006) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2010a) provide evidence that multi-board sitting is associated with 
weaker corporate governance.  
The lack of evidence on the benefits of multi-board sitting seems to be at odds with how 
efficient directorship markets should work, as one would think that prior experience serving on 
boards should matter. To shed light on this puzzle, in this study we examine the relation between 
the reputation of board members (and by extension, of the board as a whole) and monitoring 
quality, as proxied by earnings quality, incidence of restatements, and internal control 
effectiveness.2 We measure director reputation as the sum of the market value of the other 
companies on which the director serves as an independent director, and board reputation as the 
mean of the outside directors’ reputation.  
We develop and test three hypotheses on the relation between board reputation and 
financial reporting quality. The skilled director hypothesis posits that reputable directors have a 
positive impact on monitoring. This hypothesis builds on Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen 
                                                
1 Citigroup to nominate new board members as part of revamp, Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2009. 
2 Existing empirical evidence on the impact of outside directors on firm performance is mixed. Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1990), Core et al. (1999), and Nguyen and Nielsen (2009) find a positive effect of outside directors on firm 
performance measures. In contrast, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Klein (1998), and 
Bhagat and Black (1997, 2002) find no evidence that outside directors affect firm value.  
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(1983), who argue that reputable directors have more experience as officers of the firm and 
hence have a stronger incentive to maintain their standing as expert businesspersons by 
monitoring diligently. In addition, compared to other directors, reputable directors have more to 
lose in terms of reputation capital and thus are expected to exert more monitoring effort or 
establish better monitoring processes to reduce the probability of financial reporting failure, the 
consequences of which include loss of directors’ board seats (Srivivasan 2005, Helland 2006, 
and Fich and Shivdasani 2007) and litigation.  
In contrast to the skilled director hypothesis, the ineffective director hypothesis posits that 
reputation has a negative causal effect on earnings quality because reputable directors are less 
vigilant or too busy to monitor effectively. For instance, CEOs may have a preference for 
directors who are less vigilant monitors and more likely to allow the CEO to obtain excessive 
compensation (Core et al. 1999), consume perquisites, and engage in other activities that run 
counter to maximizing shareholder value (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998). According to this 
view, directors who sit on several boards (and achieve high reputation) are those directors who 
are weak and less vigilant monitors. Further, serving on additional boards makes the director 
more occupied rendering her ineffective monitor (Fich and Shivdansi 2006)..  
The two hypotheses above suggest a causal relation between reputation and monitoring, 
whereby reputation affects monitoring either positively or negatively. However, a key issue in 
any empirical work on the effect of a board characteristic on firm governance quality or value is 
whether the board characteristic itself is an outcome of the equilibrium in the market for 
directors (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998). This alternative explanation can be formalized as the 
market for directorship hypothesis, which posits that the relation between reputation and 
earnings quality is shaped by the demand for and supply of reputable directors. On the one hand, 
reputable directors are a unique subgroup of directors whose marginal benefit from serving on an 
additional board is less than that of other directors,3 while their marginal cost is higher because 
they have more to lose in terms of reputation capital in the case of financial reporting failure. 
This implies that, compared to other potential directors, reputable directors are likely to be more 
selective when deciding on which boards to sit and therefore likely to serve on boards of firms 
                                                
3 The benefit from sitting on the board includes enhanced business connections, reputation, and compensation 
(Lorsch and MacIver 1989; Fama and Jensen 1983; Yermack 2004; Perry 2000; Linn and Park 2005).  
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with high financial reporting quality.4 On the other hand, the demand for reputable directors is 
likely to be higher for firms that operate in volatile business environments and as a result have 
low earnings quality. Because of the nature of their operations, these firms require the business 
experience of a reputable CEO (Francis et al. 2008) and thus may also require the skills of 
reputable directors who can provide valuable advice to management. In such instances the value 
of a director is not in her monitoring skills but rather in her business experience and connections. 
Hence, if a director’s experience is a major demand consideration in the market for directorship, 
the relation between reputation and earnings quality is likely to be negative.  
We distinguish between the market for directorship, skilled director, and ineffective 
director hypotheses using changes and levels analyses. We first analyze the relation between the 
reputation of newly appointed directors and earnings quality in the previous year. The results 
suggest that earnings quality is not a factor in the appointment of a reputable director to the 
company. Rather, reputable directors are appointed to large companies with lower operating risk 
and to companies where the board of directors already comprises high reputation directors. The 
lack of a significant association between the reputation of newly appointed directors and 
earnings quality suggests that reputable directors are not chosen by CEOs of firms with poor 
reporting quality, nor is reporting quality an important factor in a director’s decision to sit on a 
board. However, the finding that the reputation of new directors is positively (negatively) 
associated with size (operating risk) suggests that earnings quality may affect the decision of 
reputable directors, albeit indirectly because innate earnings quality is positively (negatively) 
related to size (operating risk). 
We next examine the relation between changes in board reputation and monitoring quality 
in subsequent periods. We find that a positive change in board reputation leads to improved 
financial reporting quality and monitoring effectiveness. In particular, firms exhibit higher 
earnings quality, a lower likelihood of restatement, and more effective internal controls 
following a positive change in board reputation. We find similar results when we focus on the 
reputation of newly appointed directors, ignoring the reputation of directors who left the 
                                                
4 Fahlenbrach et al. (2010a) show that CEOs are more likely to join boards of large established firms. Prior evidence 
also shows that directors try to avoid firms in distress: Yermack (2004) finds that directors resign following poor 
performance, and Gupta and Fields (2009), Asthana and Balsam (2009), and Bar Hava and Segal (2010) find that 
directors resign when they expect future poor performance. Taken together these studies show that directors prefer 
to sit on the boards of certain firms, but it is not clear whether reporting quality is an important characteristic in their 
decision.  
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company (as the resignation of directors is not expected to reduce the effectiveness of monitoring 
and reporting procedures already in place). These findings suggest that changes in reputation that 
are attributed primarily to the reputation of new directors are positively associated with changes 
in financial reporting quality in subsequent periods. We further corroborate these results using 
the change in listing requirements in 2002, which required firms to have a majority of 
independent directors by fiscal 2004. The change affected primarily firms that did not have a 
majority of independent directors in 2002, and therefore, these firms typically increased 
substantially the number of independent directors resulting in greater proportion of outside 
directors as well as increase in mean board reputation. Using difference-in-difference approach, 
we find that while the change in the number of outside directors is not associated with change in 
earnings quality, the change in mean board reputation is positively associated with change 
earnings quality. These results suggest that the degree of board independence by itself is not an 
important factor of the quality of monitoring. Rather, director reputation is critical in determining 
the effectiveness of the board of directors vis a vie financial reporting quality. 
To complement the changes analyses above, we examine the association between the levels 
of board reputation and earnings quality. While endogeneity between reputation and earnings 
quality may exist, our proxy for board reputation does not appear to be subject to bi-directional 
causality or endogeneity concerns. This is because board reputation is based on the market value 
of other firms in which the board members serve and hence there should not be a direct causal 
effect of firm characteristics on reputation. Nevertheless, to alleviate endogeneity concerns we 
also estimate the relation between earnings quality and reputation using three- stage least squares 
(3SLS). Both methodologies indicate that earnings quality is increasing in the level of board 
reputation, and the 3SLS regression indicates that reputation is not affected by earnings quality.  
Taken together, the results are consistent with the skilled director hypothesis: a positive 
change in reputation is associated with a positive change in earnings quality in subsequent 
periods, and the level of earnings quality is positively related to the level of reputation.  
This study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, it adds to the literature 
on the monitoring role of outside directors. Wiesbach (1988) finds that outside directors are 
proactive in replacing non-performing CEOs. Numerous studies in the U.S., U.K., and Australia 
also find that outside directors are associated with reduced earnings manipulation, fraud, or 
earnings management (for example, Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley 1996; Xie et al. 2003; Peasnell 
6 
 
et al. 2005; Mather and Ramsay 2006). However, within the group of outside board members, 
the literature is silent on the relation between characteristics of outside directors and monitoring 
performance. This study recognizes that 1) not all outside directors are the same (as some may 
have multiple appointments), and 2) within the group of multi-directors, some directors may 
have a higher reputation than others (as serving on the boards of several small companies may 
not carry the same reputation as serving on the boards of two large companies). Our analysis 
reveals that multi-directors have a positive causal effect on reporting quality. 
Second, the paper adds to the literature on the relation between reputation and earnings 
quality. Francis et al. (2010) document a negative association between CEO reputation and 
earnings quality because firms that operate in a more volatile operating environment require 
more talented CEOs. Cao et al. (2011) find a positive association between firm reputation and 
earnings quality, as reputable firms are less likely to misstate their financial statements and have 
higher earnings quality. Our study complements this line of research by investigating the impact 
of directors’ reputation on earnings quality.  
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses and 
discusses our proxy for director reputation. Section 3 describes the data and reports univariate 
results. Section 4 presents the main empirical results – the analysis of changes in board 
composition, and the levels analysis where reporting quality and reputation are jointly 
determined. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses and Proxy for Reputation 
2.1 Hypotheses  
2.1.1. The Skilled Director Hypothesis 
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the market for outside directorships 
serves as an important source of incentives for outside directors to develop their reputation as 
monitoring specialists. According to this view, outside directors’ decision- making and 
monitoring quality can be assessed based on their accumulated reputation capital, which is 
reflected in the number and size of firms in which they serve as directors. A director’s reputation 
capital thus indicates her monitoring skills and work experience as a director and officer of the 
firm. These monitoring skills and work experience give the director the tools needed to monitor 
management effectively and in turn ensure high earnings quality.  
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Reputable directors not only have the experience and knowledge needed to monitor 
effectively, but also have strong incentives to ensure high quality monitoring because reputation 
capital and the likelihood of additional board appointments are affected by reporting quality, 
especially in cases of financial reporting failure. Srivivasan (2005) documents a high rate of 
director turnover in firms that restate earnings downwards. Similarly, Helland (2006) finds that 
directors of restating firms lose other directorship positions, and Fich and Shivdasani (2007) 
show that following a financial fraud lawsuit outside directors experience a decline in other 
board seats. The evidence therefore implies that reputable directors have an incentive to exert 
more effort and be more vigilant monitors compared to non-reputable directors because they 
have more to lose in terms of reputation capital.5  
Overall, the skilled director hypothesis posits a positive correlation between reputation and 
earnings quality because reputable directors have both the ability and the incentives to monitor 
management effectively. 
 
2.1.2. The Ineffective Director Hypothesis 
In contrast to the skilled director hypothesis, the ineffective director hypothesis posits that 
director reputation is negatively associated with reporting quality. This negative association is 
attributed to two factors that may affect the quality of monitoring by reputable directors. First, 
directors who hold several directorship positions, i.e. reputable directors, may be more attractive 
to CEOs to the extent that they are more likely to allow the CEO to obtain excessive 
compensation (see Bebchuk and Fried 2006 for a comprehensive discussion on the subject of 
directors and CEO compensation), to ignore poor CEO performance, and to allow the CEO to 
consume perquisites and engage in other activities that run counter to maximizing shareholder 
value (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998). Thus, according to this view, directors can gain additional 
board seats, and in turn reputation capital, by not being effective monitors. Second, serving on 
                                                
5 Prior literature also provides evidence that director reputation is affected by firm performance. Gilson (1990) finds 
that the turnover of outside directors in firms that experience financial distress is much higher than the average 
director turnover. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) show that if a firm reduces its dividend then the likelihood of its 
executives gaining an additional outside directorship falls. And Ferris et al. (2003) and Yermack (2004) find that 
company performance affects the number of boards seats held by its outside directors in subsequent years. The 
literature further suggests that directors are aware of reputation penalties and take actions to avoid such penalties. 
Asthana and Balsam (2009) document that outside directors are likely to resign when they expect the company to 
have financial difficulties. Similarly, Bar Hava and Segal (2010) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2010b) find that 
resignations of outside directors are associated with poor financial and operating performance both before and after 
the resignation. 
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multiple boards can make directors too busy to be effective monitors. Consistent with the busy 
argument, Beasley (1996) finds that the probability of being involved in accounting fraud is 
increasing in the average number of directorships held by outside directors. Fich and Shivdansi 
(2006) further show that busy boards, defined as boards where more than 50% of the directors 
are considered busy, are associated with weak corporate governance.  
Taken together, the above arguments suggest that if reputable directors are busy or weak 
monitors, high reputation is associated with ineffective monitoring and hence lower earnings 
quality.  
 
2.1.3. The Market for Directorship Hypothesis 
The two hypotheses above posit that the relation between reputation and financial reporting 
quality is directional, that is, reputation affects reporting quality. However, any relation that 
exists between reputation and financial reporting may be a result of the equilibrium in the market 
for directorship, with the relation between reputation and earnings quality shaped by the 
determinants of the demand for and supply of reputable directors.  
On the supply side, the significant negative consequences of financial reporting failure on 
reputation imply that directors in general have an incentive to serve on the boards of those firms 
with an ex-ante low risk of financial reporting failure. However, given their high reputation 
capital, reputable directors are more likely to choose to serve on boards of firms with high 
quality financial reporting because the marginal benefit (cost) of serving on another board is 
lower (higher) for them compared to that for non-reputable directors. The relation between 
reputation and earnings quality is therefore expected to be positive. 
Turning to the demand side, the demand for reputable directors is potentially higher for 
firms with low innate earnings quality. Francis et al. (2005) shows that earnings quality consists 
of two components , innate and discretionary, with the innate component determined largely by 
the firm’s operating environment and the discretionary component determined by management’s 
financial reporting choices. Firms that operate in volatile markets are expected to have low 
earnings quality because reported financial information is less useful for predicting future cash 
flows. Because of the nature of these firms’ operations, they are likely to require the business 
experience and skills of a reputable CEO (Francis et al. 2008). As a result, these firms may also 
require reputable directors who can provide valuable advice to management. In such instances 
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the value of reputable director rests not in her monitoring skills but rather in her business 
experience and connections. Hence, the relation between reputation and earnings quality is 
expected to be negative.  
 
2.1.4. The Three Hypotheses: Summary 
The three hypotheses, and their relationship to the market of outside directors, are 
depicted in the following two diagrams: 
 
The top diagram represents a possible equilibrium in the market for directorship. Under 
this scenario, a positive correlation may exist if the supply effect dominates (reputable directors 
choose firms with high reporting quality), whereas a negative correlation is expected if the 
demand effect dominates in the market for directorship (low earnings quality firms demand 
reputable directors that can help management navigate a firm’s challenging operating 
environment).  
The bottom diagram shows the off-equilibrium outcomes, where board reputation has a 
causal effect on reporting quality. The skilled director hypothesis predicts improved reporting 
quality because reputable directors have greater knowledge and experience than non-reputable 
directors. The ineffective director hypothesis predicts the opposite. The challenge of the paper’s 
empirical design is to differentiate between the three hypotheses. 
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2.2 Reputation and Empirical Proxies  
Reputation refers to the position one occupies or the standing one has in others’ opinion 
with respect to achievement, integrity, and the like. Though it is well understood what is meant 
by reputation, measuring the reputation of an individual is a non-trivial exercise. Milbourn 
(2003) presents evidence that highlights the problem with using any one empirical proxy. He 
suggests several proxies for measuring a CEO’s reputation (tenure, whether the CEO is 
appointed from outside the firm, number of business-related articles in which the CEO’s name 
appears) and finds that the correlation between the different proxies is very low, making it hard 
to interpret the economic meaning behind the empirical findings associated with a particular 
proxy.6  
At first glance, it may seem that if measuring the reputation of a CEO is challenging, it 
should be even more difficult to measure the reputation of outside directors, who are not 
frequently quoted in the press. The most popular measure of director reputation is the number of 
directorships held by the director (e.g., Gilson 1990; Ferris et al. 2003; Yermack 2004). We 
argue that the reputation of multi-board directors can be captured by the sum of the market 
values of the other firms on which they serve as independent directors (i.e., firms other than the 
specific firm for which the director’s reputation is measured). This measure is likely to be a 
better proxy for reputation for two reasons. First, it allows for variation in reputation across 
directors who hold the same number of directorship positions. Second, it recognizes that serving 
on the boards of large firms may result in different reputation capital than serving on the boards 
of small firms and therefore allows for different incentives vis-a-vis monitoring quality.7 
 
  
                                                
6 Measuring CEO reputation by cumulating the number of articles has become common practice in many studies 
(e.g., Rajgopal et al. 2006; Francis et al. 2008). 
7 Note that arguabley the best reputation variable for a CEO would be the market value of the firm she runs. 
However, because size is typically a control variable, it is usually not possible to use size as a reputation variable. 
This problem is circumvented here because reputation of the directors is based on other firms. 
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3. Data and Univariate Analyses 
3.1 Data 
We obtain director data from RiskMetrics, a provider of corporate governance data. The 
data include a range of variables related to individual board directors such as gender, 
employment, age, and tenure, and cover primarily S&P 1500 companies and pertain to the 1996 
through 2009 period.  
The initial dataset comprises 206,939 director-years. We measure director reputation as the 
sum of the beginning-of-year market value of all other public companies in RiskMetric’s 
database where the director serves as an independent director. If the director does not appear on 
the board of any other company in the database, we assign a value of zero to the reputation 
variable.8 The reputation measure therefore excludes the market value of the firm of interest to 
avoid a spurious correlation between board reputation and size. To be able to compute director 
reputation, we require non-missing Director ID identifier and beginning-of-year market value of 
equity. These restrictions reduce the sample to 133,931 director-years. [merge]We also exclude 
firm-years with missing reputation data for more than 50% of the directors, and small companies 
with market value of equity of less than $50 million, resulting in sample of 132,815 (13,957) 
director-years (firm-years) for the 1996 through 2009 period. 
 
3.2 Director Reputation and Director Characteristics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the relation between reputation and director 
characteristics. We partition the sample of independent directors into those that have a reputation 
value that is larger than zero (i.e., serve on at least one other public company’s board), and those 
that have a reputation value of zero (i.e., serve only on the respective company’s board). 
Reputable  directors serve on an average of 2.45 boards and are a bit older than non-reputable 
boards (average age of 61.7 compared to 60.9 for non-reputable directors). Interestingly, the 
proportion of females among reputable directors (14.1%) is significantly higher than that among 
non-reputable directors (11.9%). This indicates that boards consist largely of men, and that 
women have a higher likelihood of serving on a board if they serve on other boards. Reputable 
directors are less likely to serve on the audit committee, potentially because audit committees 
                                                
8 Our reputation measure does not consider reputation related to companies not included in the S&P 1500, private 
companies, trusts, public sector organizations, etc.  
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require greater time and effort, and membership in audit committee imposes greater reputation 
risk on directors (Srinivasan 2005).9 However, reputable directors tend to serve on and chair the 
compensation committee, consistent with Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Core et al. (1999), who 
claim that managers prefer to appoint multiple-board directors to the compensation committee. 
The rationale for such appointments is that these directors are associated with interlocked boards 
(which tend to provide personal favors to the CEO) or are simply too busy to effectively monitor 
the high pay of the CEO. The latter explanation is also consistent with the ineffective director 
hypothesis.  
We further find that a quarter of the independent reputable directors are CEOs and/or serve 
as chairman of the board of other public companies. This result indicates that high reputation is 
closely related to managerial experience, as CEOs and board chairmen are highly experienced 
individuals. Reputable directors can therefore use their experience in other firms to help improve 
internal controls and monitoring mechanisms within the firm, as well as consult and provide the 
firm business relationships. Finally, we find that a larger proportion of reputable directors tend to 
miss board meetings, consistent with reputable directors being busy and having less time to 
devote to the firm.  
Overall, Table 1 provides evidence that reputable directors are more experienced business 
managers but are busier. 
 
3.3 Board Reputation and Firm Characteristics  
Using the individual director reputation data, we compute board-year reputation as the log 
of one plus mean director reputation. We also use IRRC data to compute other board 
characteristics. We obtain financial data from Compustat and CRSP, and restatement and internal 
control effectiveness data from Audit Analytics. Since the restatement data in Audit Analytics 
starts in 2000, we restrict the data to the 2000 to 2009 period, which reduces the sample to 
10,824 firm-years. In addition, we exclude financial services firms and other regulated 
companies (930 observations), observations with missing accruals quality measures (2,791 
observations), and observations with a missing value for any of the other control variables used 
in the analysis (1,293 observations), bringing the sample size to 5,814 firm-years for 955 firms.  
                                                
9 While reputable directors are less likely than non-reputable directors to serve on the audit committee, a significant 
proportion of reputable directors does serve on the committee (>53%). Note also that reputable directors are as 
likely to serve as Chairman of the audit committee. 
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Table 2, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for financial reporting quality as well as 
firm and board characteristics. We use four proxies for financial reporting quality: accruals 
quality (AQ), performance-matched absolute discretionary accruals (DA), a restatement indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm-year was restated and zero otherwise, and an 
effective internal controls indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm had effective 
internal controls and zero otherwise. We estimate AQ based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model as modified by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005). We estimate the absolute 
value of performance-matched discretionary accruals based on the Jones (1991) model as 
modified by Dechow et al. (1995), with the performance matching based on Kothari et al. 
(2005). Appendix A describes the estimation procedures for AQ and DA. Importantly, AQ and 
DA are negatively correlated with earnings quality – higher values indicate lower earnings 
quality. Appendix B describes how we compute the other variables that are used in this study. 
As can be seen in Panel A, mean (median) board reputation is $7.82 billion ($1.29 billion), 
which is comparable to the mean market value of equity. With respect to the financial reporting 
quality proxies, about 10% of the firm-year observations were restated, while effective internal 
controls exist in most firm-year observations (94%). Mean AQ (DA) is 0.036 (0.039), which is 
broadly consistent with the findings in the literature.  
The results on the firm characteristic variables indicate that the sample firms are skewed in 
terms of size: mean (median) equity value is $8.32 billion ($1.7 billion). Mean market-to-book is 
3.03, and mean equity return volatility is 2.8%. Although 69% of the observations are associated 
with negative earnings realizations over the past five years, mean return on assets is 4.5%, and 
52% of the observations are associated with firms that pay dividends. Book leverage is on 
average 20%.  
The median number of board members is nine, of which an average of 72% are 
independent directors. The average proportion of busy directors (i.e., directors who serve on two 
or more boards)10 is 30%, and 18.8% of the firm-year observations are classified as having busy 
boards (i.e., the majority of directors on the board are busy). In our sample, 58% of firm-year 
observations have a CEO who also chairs the board. Directors’ mean tenure is 8.7 years, the 
                                                
10 Fitch and Shivdasani (2006) define directors as busy if they serve on three or more boards. However, Linck et al. 
(2009), among others, provide empirical evidence that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has caused a shift in the 
demand and supply of directors and that there are far fewer multiple directorships in recent years. In our sample we 
find that only a few directors have three or more directorships and hence we use the two directorships threshold.  
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mean director’s age is 61.2, and the mean equity ownership of directors is 1.3%. Finally, on 
average almost one director per board is also a CEO in another firm.   
Table 2, Panel B shows the mean firm and board characteristics separately for firm-years 
with zero board reputation and for firm-years with positive board reputation.11 The results 
indicate that the two groups are associated with different firm and board characteristics. 
Specifically, firms with reputable boards have higher financial reporting quality – lower accruals 
quality, lower discretionary accruals, lower incidence of restatements, and higher effective 
internal controls, although the difference in the latter is not statistically significant. These firms 
are also larger in terms of market value of equity, have a higher market-to-book ratio, are more 
profitable, are less risky (have lower return volatility), and are more likely to pay dividends. 
Turning to the board characteristics, the results indicate that firms with reputable boards have 
larger boards and a greater proportion of independent directors, which is consistent with better 
governance. However,  25% of the reputable board firm-years are characterized as having a busy 
board, and CEOs are more like to be board chairman in thse firms than in firms with zero board 
reputation.  
Overall, the results in Table 2, Panel B indicate that there is a positive association between 
reputation and monitoring, consistent with both the market for directorship hypothesis, which 
posits that reputable directors choose firms with better reporting quality, and the skilled director 
hypothesis, which posits that high reporting quality is attributed in part to reputable directors. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
To overcome the empirical difficulty of disentagling causality from market equilibrium, a 
recent line of corporate finance research analyzes causality by employing an event study 
methodology (see Yermack (2006) for a survey). Using this methodology, Fich and Shivdansani 
(2006) find that shareholders react more positively to the resignation of a director who serves on 
multiple boards compared to a director who does not, which suggests that reputable directors are 
perceived to be ineffective monitors. However, while the event study methodology mitigates 
endogeneity concerns, an underlying assumption of this methodology is that the market 
rationally anticipates the effect of a reputable director on firm performance. In addition, one 
                                                
11 We obtain similar results when we partition the sample into high (above-median) and low (below -median) 
reputation firms.  
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cannot use this methodology to gauge the impact of reputable directors on monitoring since 
monitoring quality is typically measured over a long period of time. In this study we analyze our 
hypotheses following a different approach. Because a director must be appointed before he can 
affect reporting quality, we first analyze the equilibrium phenomenon, that is, we analyze the 
characteristics associated with the appointment of new reputable directors. Aside from allowing 
us to test the market for directorship hypothesis, this step allows us to gauge the research design 
methodology for testing the skilled vs. ineffective director hypotheses. Finding that a reputable 
director’s decision to join a company depends on financial reporting quality would require 
controlling for endogeneity when testing the impact of reputation on monitoring.  
 
4.1 Appointment of Reputable Directors and Firm Characteristics  
In this section we examine which firm characteristics are important in the appointment 
decision, and in particular, whether the firm’s financial reporting quality is a determinant of the 
market for directorship.  
We begin by examining the relation between the reputation of new directors and firm 
characteristics. New Reputation is measured as the mean reputation of the directors who joined 
the company during the year. We ignore the effect of director resignations on board reputation 
because resignations are typically due to personal reasons (e.g., Bar Hava and Segal 2011). We 
examine the relation between New Reputation and firm characteristics in the year prior to joining 
the board to eliminate any impact that  new directors may have on the firm in their first year.  
Table 3, Panel A compares firm characteristics in the year prior to the appointment of 
reputable directors and non-reputable directors. The results indicate that new reputable directors 
are more likely to join firms with better reporting quality, as can be seen from the lower accruals 
quality and lower discretionary accruals (the difference in discretionary accruals is significant at 
10.7%). New reputable directors are also associated with firms with higher market value of 
equity, lower stock return volatility, higher incidence of dividend payments, lower incidence of 
losses, and higher return on assets. Further, they tend to be appointed to firms with a larger 
board, larger proportion of independent directors, and larger proportion of CEOs among the 
independent directors, as well as to firms that already have high board reputation. Thus, 
consistent with the supply argument of the market for directorship hypothesis, the univariate 
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statistics indicate that new reputable directors choose to join firms with high earnings quality and 
low operating risk.  
Panel B of Table 3 presents the multivariate regression results. The dependent variable is 
New Reputation (measured as the log of one plus the mean reputation of directors that joined 
during the year) and the independent variables are firm and board characteristics measured as of 
the year prior to the appointment. Given the non-negative distribution of the dependent variable, 
we estimate the regressions using the Tobit regression methodology.  
Column 1 presents the regression results using accruals quality as the proxy for earnings 
quality. The coefficient on accruals quality is not significant, suggesting that reporting quality is 
not a determinant of reputable directors’ decision to serve on a board. However, the results also 
indicate that reputable directors are attracted to large and less volatile firms that already have a 
high reputation board, suggesting that reputable directors choose companies with lower operating 
risk that are likely to maintain or enhance the directors’ own reputation and business 
connections. Thus, although the coefficient on accruals quality is not significant, the coefficients 
on size and return volatility suggest that financial reporting risk does affect the decision of 
reputable directors, albeit indirectly.  
To further explore this possibility, we separate accruals quality into its innate and 
discretionary components. Following the extant literature we regress accruals quality on factors 
previously shown to be related to innate earnings quality: firm size, measured as market value of 
equity; investment opportunity set and growth prospects, both of which are captured by the 
market-to-book ratio; cash flow (sales) variability, measured as the standard deviation of 
operating cash flows (total sales) scaled by total assets over the past five years; operating cycle, 
measured as the sum of inventory and accounts receivable days; and the incidence of losses 
(negative income before extraordinary items) over the past five years. The predicted value 
(residual) of the regression is the innate (discretionary) component of accruals quality. Column 2 
presents the results. We find that the results are virtually identical to those in Column 1. 
Specifically, the coefficients on size, volatility, and existing board reputation have the same sign 
and remain significant, while all other coefficients (including the innate and discretionary 
components of accruals quality) are not significant. These results provide additional support to 
the view that reporting quality is not a determinant of reputable directors’ decision to join a 
company. Columns 3 and 4 replicate the regressions in Columns 1 and 2, respectively, using 
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discretionary accruals as the proxy for financial reporting quality. The results are very similar 
and again indicate that reporting quality is not directly related to the level of new reputation.12 
Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest that there is no direct relation between new 
reputation and earnings quality. However, since earnings quality is negatively (positively) related 
to size (operating risk), the positive (negative) association between new reputation and size 
(return volatility) indicates that we cannot rule out the possibility that reputable directors choose 
to serve on the boards of firms with ex-ante lower financial reporting risk. 
 
4.2 Causal Effect of New Appointments on Monitoring  
There are two competing hypothesis concerning the causal effect of reputation on 
monitoring. The skilled director hypothesis posits that reputation indicates better monitoring 
ability, which implies that the appointment of reputable directors should enhance monitoring 
quality. In contrast, the ineffective director hypothesis suggests that reputable directors are not 
effective monitors because they have less time to monitor effectively or they choose to cater to 
management, which implies that earnings quality should decrease following the appointment of 
reputable directors. We investigate the impact of change in board reputation on monitoring using 
two research designs. In the first, we compute the change in monitoring proxies following 
change in board reputation that is attributed to new directors or departure of existing directors. In 
the second research design, we examine the effect of the new rules by major stock exchanges in 
2002 requiring all listed firms to have a majority of independent directors among board members 
by fiscal year 2004. The new rule had particular impact on companies where the proportion of 
outside directors in 2002 was less than 50%. To comply with the new rules, these companies 
typically added new independent directors to the board. Hence, the change in regulation provides 
a setting to examine the impact of change board independence and board reputation on 
monitoring, where the change in board composition is exogenous to the firm as it is attributed to 
new regulation.  
 
 
 
                                                
12 Since new reputation may be non-linearly related to firm and board characteristics, we estimate the regression 
using the Probit methodology where the dependent variable is an indicator variable coded as one if the director has a 
positive reputation and zero otherwise. The results are virtually identical to those reported. 
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4.2.1 Impact of New Appointments on Monitoring  
To examine the impact of changes in board reputation on monitoring, we first identify the 
firm-years in which there was a change in board composition. We then measure the overall 
change in board reputation that is attributed to the reputation of the directors who joined or left 
the firm. In particular, we measure the change in board reputation as the sum of the reputation of 
the new directors minus the sum of reputation of the directors who left the firm.13 We next 
classify the sample of firm-years that experienced a change in board reputation into three groups: 
negative change in reputation (i.e., the reputation of the directors who left is greater than the 
reputation of the directors who joined the firm), zero change in reputation (typically applies to 
firms that have zero board reputation, i.e., none of the directors of the company serves on another 
public firm’s board), and positive change in reputation. 
Table 4, Panel A compares firm and board characteristics in the year prior to the change 
in reputation across the three categories of change in reputation. Comparing firm and board 
characteristics across the positive and negative change-in-reputation groups, we find that firms 
with a positive change in reputation have higher accruals quality, suggesting weaker earnings 
quality, but the differences in discretionary accruals, restatements, and internal control 
effectiveness are not significant. In addition, firms with a positive change in reputation are less 
likely to pay dividends and appear to have worse corporate governance given they have a smaller 
board size, a lower independent director ratio, and fewer CEO-directors. These firms also have 
lower board reputation.  
A distinguishing characteristic between the zero change-in-reputation group and the non-
zero (negative and positive) change-in-reputation groups is that the level of the latter groups’ 
reputation is higher. This is because the zero change-in-reputation group largely includes cases in 
which the new and/or departing directors have zero reputation (i.e., serve only on the respective 
firm’s board). Untabulated results indicate that the positive and negative groups have higher 
earnings quality (lower accruals quality and lower discretionary accruals), higher board 
reputation, and busier boards. These results support the skilled director hypothesis and are 
                                                
13 In other words, we do not consider changes in board reputation due to changes in existing directors’ reputation. 
Recall that director reputation is measured as the sum of the market value of all other public companies where she 
serves as director. As a result, director reputation changes constantly. We therefore focus on changes in board 
reputation that are driven by changes in board composition. 
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inconsistent with the ineffective director hypothesis. Specifically, while firms with a positive or 
negative change in reputation have busier boards, they also have higher earnings quality.  
Panel B of Table 4 provides direct evidence on the effect of a change in reputation on 
monitoring by comparing the proxies for financial reporting quality in the periods before and 
after the change in reputation.14 Since the proxies show improvement over time we  
de-mean and de-trend them to avoid spurious correlation between the proxies and change in 
reputation.15 The results indicate that the companies that experience a positive change in 
reputation exhibit higher earnings quality, as evident by lower accruals quality and discretionary 
accruals, fewer restatements, and more effective internal controls, after the change. These results 
provide direct support for the skilled director hypothesis: a positive change in board reputation 
leads to improved monitoring, consistent with the conjecture that experienced directors are more 
effective monitors.  
Table 4 also shows that companies with zero change in reputation experience an increase 
in accruals quality, implying that they exhibit lower earnings quality in the subsequent period. 
However, there is no change in discretionary accruals, incidence of restatements, and internal 
effective controls. Interestingly, companies with a negative change in reputation show 
improvement in earnings quality – accruals quality and discretionary accruals are lower in the 
years after the change in reputation – but there is no change in the number of restatements or in 
the effectiveness of internal controls. While this result may appear to contradict the skilled 
director hypothesis, the hypothesis implies that an increase in reputation should lead to better 
monitoring but not the opposite. That is, there is no reason to assume that the decrease in 
reputation should lead to deterioration in monitoring for two reasons: first, while these firms 
experienced a negative change in reputation, they still have high reputation capital (see Table 4, 
Panel A). Second, monitoring is facilitated by internal controls and procedures that, once in 
place, are less dependent (at least in the short term) on the composition of the board.  
                                                
14 Some firms experience a change in reputation in more than one year during the sample period. To mitigate the 
impact of confounding effects we include in the analysis the first change in reputation only. For example, suppose 
we have data for a certain firm from 2000 through 2009, and the firm experiences a change in board reputation in 
2003 and in 2004. For the purpose of our analysis we ignore the change in reputation in 2004, and gauge the impact 
of the change in reputation on monitoring by comparing the financial reporting quality in 2004-2009 (post-period) to 
that in 2000-2002 (pre-period).   
15 Untabulated results show that monitoring has improved over time – there are fewer restatements towards the end 
of the sample and fewer cases in which firms have ineffective internal controls. Discretionary accruals and accruals 
quality have also been decreasing over the sample period. We therefore use the residual from the regression of each 
monitoring proxy on a time variable. 
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Table 4, Panel C replicates the analysis in Panel B for companies with positive and zero 
New Reputation. Here we ignore the impact of directors who resigned during the year, allowing 
us to focus on the impact of new reputation on earnings quality and monitoring effectiveness. 
The results are virtually identical to those reported in Panel B. Companies with a positive new 
reputation have lower discretionary accruals and better accruals quality, fewer restatements, and 
more effective internal controls in the period subsequent to the change in reputation, whereas 
companies with zero new reputation have higher accruals quality following the change in board 
composition and no change in the other proxies for financial reporting quality. 
Overall, the results in Table 4 indicate that an increase in board reputation leads to higher 
financial reporting quality, consistent with the skilled director hypothesis and inconsistent with 
the ineffective director hypothesis. 
 
4.2.2 Impact of Change in Board Reputation following Change in Listing Rules 
In response to the accounting scandals in 2001 and 2002, the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (Nasdaq) proposed several changes 
to listing requirements in 2002. One of the proposed changes was that all listed firms must have 
majority of independent directors.16 The SEC approved the proposed changes in 2003, and all 
firms had to comply with the new rules by October 2004. The new rule affected primarily firms 
that did not have a majority of independent directors in 2002, and therefore, these firms typically 
increased substantially the number of independent directors resulting in greater proportion of 
outside directors as well as increase in mean board reputation. This setting therefore allows 
examining the impact of changes in board independence and board reputation on monitoring. 
One of the major advantages of using this setting is that the change in board composition was 
exogenous as it was mandated by new regulation.17   
Following Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Guthrie et al. (2010), we examine the 
impact of change in reputation on earnings quality using difference-in-differences approach for a 
                                                
16 Another major requirement was that the members of the auditing, compensation and nominating committees 
would comprise of independent directors only.  
17 Several recent studies use this setting to examine the impact of outside directors on performance and CEO 
compensation. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) finds a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that 
were more affected by the requirements, consistent with outside directors being better monitors. However, Guthrie 
et al. (2010) provide evidence that the findings in Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) are attributed to two outliers, 
and conclude that the changes in board independence had no impact on CEO compensation. Duchin et al. (2011) 
shows that increase in board independence improves performance when the cost of acquiring information is low. 
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sample of compliant and non-compliant firms, where the former (latter) sample comprises of 
firms with proportion of outside directors greater (less or equal) than 50% in 2002. Specifically, 
we restrict the sample to companies which have non-missing data in 2002 and 2005, and identify 
the compliant and non-compliant firms using the proportion of outside directors in 2002. This 
procedure results in a sample of 464 firms, of which 69 firms are classified as non-compliant. 
For each firm we compute the change in mean board reputation between 2002 and 2005. We 
then examine the change in earnings quality from the pre regulation period (2000-2002) to the 
post regulation period (2003-2005) for the compliant and non-compliant firms controlling for the 
change in board reputation.  
Table 5, Panel A provides the mean of the number and proportion of independent 
directors, and the board reputation for the sample of compliant and non-compliant firms. The 
sample of non-compliant firms experienced increase in the number of independent directors from 
3.6 in 2002 to 5.6 in 2005, and concomitant increase in the proportion of independent directors 
from 0.43 to 0.66 and in the mean board reputation from 3.245 in 2002 to 5.013 in 2005. These 
changes are statistically and economically significant. In contrast, while complaint firms 
experienced increase in these variables as well, the changes are not statistically or economically 
significant.18 
Since non-compliant firms experienced significant increase in the number of independent 
directors and in the mean board reputation, we hypothesize that the impact of change in board 
reputation on monitoring would be more pronounced for these firms. We therefore test whether 
the change in earnings quality from the pre regulation period (2000-2002) to the post regulation 
period (2003-2005) is associated with the change in mean board reputation for the sample of 
compliant and non-compliant firms.  
Table 5, Panel B shows the regression results. The regressions are estimated using OLS 
with industry fixed effects; the standard errors correct for firm clustering. The coefficients on the 
proxies for the innate portion of earnings quality have the predicted signs and are generally 
significant. Specifically, earnings quality is lower for smaller firms and firms that have higher 
                                                
18 Most non-compliant firms became compliant in 2003 as the mean proportion of independent directors increased to 
0.54. In addition, although these firms experienced monotonic increase in the number of independent directors (and 
as a result in the proportion of independent directors and board reputation) through 2005, the largest change in the 
number of independent directors was in fiscal 2003. These statistics justify the choice of the pre and post periods to 
examine the impact of the change in board reputation on monitoring. 
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market-to-book, greater operating cash flows and sales volatility, a longer operating cycle, and a 
greater incidence of losses.  
 The Accrual Quality column shows that the coefficient on mean board reputation is 
negative and marginally significant (p-value=0.104) indicating that companies with higher board 
reputation have higher earnings quality, consistent with the skilled director hypothesis. The other 
coefficients indicate that while accrual quality did not change significantly in the post period for 
either compliant or non-compliant firms in general, the change in accrual quality in the post 
period for non-compliant firms is negatively and significantly (p-value=0.09) associated with the 
change in mean board reputation. Put differently, the results indicate that the impact of the 
change in board independence on earnings quality for non-compliant firms depends on the 
change in board reputation; a mere increase in board independence is not likely to affect earnings 
quality unless the new directors have positive reputation. The results for discretionary accruals 
are similar. Specifically, the coefficient on the level of mean board reputation is negative and 
significant (p-value=0.079), and the coefficient on the change in board reputation for the non-
compliant firms in the post period is negative and significant (p-value=0.017). In contrast to the 
Accrual Quality regression, the coefficient on the dummy period is negative and significant (p-
value<0.01) indicating lower discretionary accruals in the post period for compliant and non-
compliant firms. However, the level of discretionary accruals in the post period increases with 
the overall change in board reputation (p-value=0.08). Although this result is not consistent with 
our findings, the magnitude of the coefficient (0.15) suggests that the overall change in board 
reputation in the post period has little economic impact as the overall mean of the change in 
board reputation is 0.3 and the median is 0. Hence, evaluating the impact of the change in board 
reputation in the post period on discretionary accruals at the mean indicates an increase of 0.05, 
whereas discretionary accruals decreased in the post period by 0.66. 
 Taken together, the results indicate that the increase in the number of independent 
directors by itself in the post period has no impact on monitoring. This finding is consistent with 
Guthrie et al. (2010) which shows that the changes in board independence had no impact on 
CEO compensation. However, the results also indicate that change in board reputation due to 
new reputable directors joining the firm is associated with higher earnings quality, in line with 
the skilled director hypothesis. 
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4.3 Levels Analysis: Reputation and Financial Reporting Quality 
In this section we perform levels analysis to see whether accruals quality is related to board 
reputation. Although the board composition change analysis of Section 4.2.1 would seem to be 
well suited for analyzing causality effects, it suffers from a major drawback compared to a levels 
analysis. Many of the sample firm-year observations are not associated with changes in board 
composition or are associated with zero change in reputation because the appointees and retirees 
have zero reputation. Similarly, the change in regulation related to the proportion of outside 
directors affected relatively few companies.  Yet the mean board reputation variable is dynamic 
and changes from year to year when existing directors are appointed to additional boards or 
when the market value of the other companies on which they serve changes. A levels analysis is 
able to capture variation across firms with a non-zero reputation level regardless of whether these 
firms experience a change in board composition. Further, a levels analysis allows us to control 
for the determinants of financial reporting quality. Given the finding that earnings quality is not a 
determinant of reputable directors’ decision to join a company, we first analyze the relation 
between reputation and earnings quality using OLS. To the extent that reputation and earnings 
quality are endogenously determined, we also present and discuss the results of a three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) analysis.  
We distinguish between the skilled and ineffective director hypotheses using the sign of the 
coefficient on board reputation. Because our earnings quality proxies are negatively correlated 
with earnings quality, a negative (positive) coefficient on board reputation would indicate that 
we cannot reject the skilled (ineffective) director hypothesis. Following Fich and Shivdansi 
(2006), in a sensitivity analysis we also control for the business of the board as measured by Fich 
and Shivdansi. 
The parameter estimates and their p-values are presented in Table 6, Panel A. The 
regressions are estimated using OLS with industry and year fixed effects; the standard errors 
correct for firm clustering. The coefficients on the proxies for the innate portion of earnings 
quality have the predicted signs and are generally significant. In particular, earnings quality is 
lower for smaller firms and firms that have higher market-to-book, greater operating cash flows 
and sales volatility, a longer operating cycle, and a greater incidence of losses (although the 
coefficient on losses is not significant in the discretionary accruals regressions). 
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 More importantly, Column 1 indicates that the coefficient on board reputation is negative 
but not significant (p-value=0.166, two tailed). When we include the busy board indicator 
(Column 2), the coefficient on mean board reputation remains negative and is marginally 
significant (p-value=0.108),19 and the coefficient on the busy board variable is positive but not 
significant (p-value=0.312). To the extent that the relation between accruals quality and board 
reputation is not linear, we replicate the regressions in Columns 1 and 2 replacing mean board 
reputation with High Board Reputation, an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s mean 
board reputation is higher than the median and zero otherwise.20 Column 3 shows that the 
coefficient on high board reputation is negative and highly significant (p-value<0.01). The 
coefficient remains negative and significant (p-value<0.01) when we include the busy board 
variable in Column 4. Similar to Column 2, the coefficient on busy board is positive but not 
significant (p-value=0.124). The results are similar when we use discretionary accruals as the 
proxy for earnings quality. The coefficient on mean board reputation and the high board 
reputation dummy are negative and significant at the 10% level whether we control for the busy 
board variable or not. The coefficient on busy board is positive but not significant. Taken 
together, the results in Table 6, Panel A provide further evidence that board reputation is 
associated with better earnings quality.  
In the previous section we document that financial reporting risk, and in particular 
earnings quality, is not a determinant of reputable directors’ decision to join a company. The 
relation between monitoring and reputation is thus not likely to be affected by endogeneity 
concerns. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out completely the possibility that there is an indirect 
relation between reputation and earnings quality through common factors that are potentially 
related to both variables. To address this concern, we estimate the relation between reputation 
and monitoring using three-stage-least-square analysis. 
Table 6, Panel B presents the regression results of mean board reputation on firm and 
board characteristics. We include among the firm characteristics the predicted values of accruals 
quality (Column 1) and discretionary accruals (Column 2). The predicted values come from 
                                                
19 When we include the busy board indicator without controlling for board reputation, the coefficient on the busy 
board variable is not statistically significant. 
20 While High Board Reputation (HBR) is highly correlated with the busy board indicator (0.43), the two variables 
are distinct. The busy board variable takes the value of one if the majority of the board members serve on additional 
boards, regardless of the market value of these companies, while HBR takes the value of one if the mean board 
reputation is higher than the median board reputation. Theoretically, HBR can take the value of one if one board 
member has an additional directorship, provided that she sits on the board of a high market cap firm. 
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regressions of accruals quality and discretionary accruals, respectively, on the proxies for the 
innate portion of earnings quality and the busy board indicator with industry and year fixed 
effects. The coefficients on the predicted values are positive but not significant, indicating that 
board reputation is not associated with the proxies for earnings quality. The coefficients on the 
firm characteristics suggest that firms with reputable boards are larger and more likely to pay 
dividends, and that they have higher leverage and lower profitability. Turning to the board 
characteristics, the results indicate that firms with reputable boards tend to have larger and busier 
boards, a higher proportion of independent directors, and more CEO-directors.    
Table 6, Panel C shows the regression results of the earnings quality proxies on the 
proxies for the innate portion of earnings quality and the predicted value of mean board 
reputation, which we obtain from a regression of mean board reputation on firm and board 
characteristics. The coefficients on the control variables are very similar to those reported in 
Table 5, Panel A. More importantly, the coefficient on the predicted value of board reputation is 
not significant in the accruals quality regression, but is negative and significant (p-value=0.038) 
in the discretionary accruals regression. The coefficient on the busy board indicator variable is 
positive in both regressions but not significantly different from zero. 
Overall, the results of the 3SLS analysis are also consistent with the skilled director 
hypothesis, which predicts that reputable directors improve reporting quality.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines whether board reputation has positive or negative implications for 
monitoring performance, and in particular earnings quality. We examine the association between 
reputation and monitoring by testing three hypotheses. The market for directorship hypothesis, 
which assumes that any correlation between board reputation and earnings quality is a result of 
equilibrium in the market for directorship, posits that the relation between reputation and 
financial reporting quality will be positive if reputable directors are prudent and choose to serve 
on boards of firms that are less susceptible to fraud, misreporting, or poor financial reporting. A 
negative correlation may arise, however, if the demand for reputable directors comes primarily 
from firms that operate in a volatile business environment and therefore need experienced 
directors who can provide valuable advice to management.  
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While the market for directorship hypothesis may have its merits, it is also possible that 
board reputation has a causal effect on monitoring performance. Reputable directors have strong 
incentives to maintain their standing as business experts and monitors because such standing can 
help them obtain additional board seats and the accompanying compensation and connections. 
Furthermore, directors lose reputation capital if a firm they are associated with is involved in a 
financial reporting failure. The skilled director hypothesis therefore predicts that reputable 
directors are associated with better monitoring performance. However, contrary to this 
perspective, CEOs may prefer directors who are less vigilant monitors, in which case directors 
who serve on several boards may be weak monitors. In addition, serving on many boards may 
make a director too busy to be an effective monitor. The ineffective director hypothesis thus 
predicts that reputable directors are associated with poor monitoring performance.  
The empirical analysis is based on measuring directors’ reputation by the market value of 
all firms in which they serve as directors excluding the firm for which director reputation is 
measured. We then analyze the relation between mean board reputation, measured as the mean of 
the independent directors’ reputation, and different measures of financial reporting and 
monitoring quality using changes and levels analyses. The results indicate that reputable 
directors choose companies with lower operating risk and companies that are likely to maintain 
or enhance the directors’ own reputation and business connections. We do not find that financial 
reporting quality is a direct determinant of directors’ decision to serve on a board.  
The changes and levels analyses provide support for the skilled director hypothesis and 
reject the ineffective director hypothesis. More specifically, we find that positive changes in 
board reputation resulting from the appointment of reputable directors to the board lead to 
improvements in financial reporting quality – better accruals quality, lower incidence of 
restatements, and more effective internal controls – in subsequent periods. Similar results are 
obtained when we examine the change in earnings quality for a sample of firms that added new 
independent directors in order to comply with the change to listing requirements in 2002. In 
particular, the impact of new independent directors on earnings quality is positively associated 
with the reputation of the new directors.  
These results provide direct evidence on the positive impact of directors’ reputation on 
monitoring quality and in turn financial reporting quality. Similarly, the levels analysis shows 
that earnings quality increases with the level of board monitoring. This result is confirmed using 
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a three-stage least squares analysis where reputation level and monitoring performance are 
jointly determined. 
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Appendix A: Measurement of Earnings Quality Proxies 
We measure earnings quality using accruals quality and the absolute value of performance-
matched discretionary accruals.  
 
Accruals Quality 
Accruals Quality (AQ) is measured as the extent to which current accruals map into cash 
flows. We follow the extant literature and estimate AQ based on Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) 
model as modified by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005). Specifically, accruals quality 
is the standard deviation of the residual from cross-sectional regressions of working capital 
accruals on cash flows from operations in the current, prior, and future periods, change in 
revenues, and gross PPE; all variables are scaled by average total assets. 
The regression model is as follows:  
TCAj,t =αj +α1,jCFOj,t−1 +α2,jCFOj,t +α3,tCFOj,t+1 +α4,jΔSALEj,t +α5,jPPEGTj,t + vj,t, 
where TCAj,t is total current accruals of firm j in year t, calculated as the change in (ACTj,t − 
LCTj,t − CHEj,t + DLCj,t) between years t and t-1, in which ACTj,t is total current assets, LCTj,t is 
total current liabilities, CHEj,t is cash and cash equivalents, and DLCj,t is short-term debt; CFOj,t 
is cash flow from operations, calculated as IBj,t − TAj,t, in which IB is income before 
extraordinary items and TA is total accruals as given by TCAj,t-DPj,t, where DP is depreciation 
expense; ΔSALEj,t is change in revenues between years t−1 and t; and PPEGTj,t is gross value of 
property, plant, and equipment. 
We estimate the regression by industry based on Fama and French (1997) industry 
classifications for each year, requiring a minimum of 20 observations in each industry-year. We 
compute AQ as the standard deviation of firm j’s residuals over years t-4 through t. A higher AQ 
value indicates greater volatility in the mapping of accruals to cash flow, suggesting in turn 
lower earnings quality. Thus, AQ is negatively associated with the quality of accounting 
information. 
 
Absolute Value of Performance-Matched Discretionary Accruals 
Our second measure of earnings quality is the absolute value of performance-matched 
discretionary accruals, which are estimated based on the Jones (1991) model as modified by 
Dechow et al. (1995), with the performance matching based on Kothari et al. (2005). The model 
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aims to estimate “normal” accruals based on total accruals, the change in sales, and the level of 
property, plant, and equipment. Performance-matched discretionary accruals are then computed 
as the difference between the firm’s discretionary accruals (unexplained portion of total accruals) 
and the median discretionary accruals for the firm’s industry return-on-assets decile.  
Specifically, for each of the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries with at least 20 firms in 
year t, we estimate the following model: 
TAj,t =αj (1) + α1,jΔSALE-ΔRECj,t +α2,jPPEGTj,t + vj,t, 
where ΔREC is the change in gross receivables and all other variables are as defined above. All 
variables are scaled by lagged total assets. We measure discretionary accruals in year t as the 
difference between total accruals and the predicted value from the regression above. We then 
compute performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as the difference between firm j’s 
discretionary accruals and the median value of discretionary accruals for the firm’s industry 
return-on-assets decile. To the extent that the model correctly depicts the accruals generating 
process, large negative or positive values of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
indicates a greater likelihood of low quality accruals. Thus, the absolute value of performance-
matched discretionary accruals is negatively correlated with the quality of accounting 
information. 
33 
 
Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
 
Director Reputation – sum of beginning-of-year market value of all other public companies 
included in the RiskMetrics’ database in which the director serves as an independent director 
(Data Source: RiskMetrics); 
Mean Board Reputation – log of 1 + mean independent directors’ reputation (Data Source: 
RiskMetrics); 
Restatement Indicator - equals one if the firm-year was restated and zero otherwise (Data 
Source: Audit Analytics); 
Effective Internal Control Indicator - equals one if the firm had effective internal controls 
during the year and zero otherwise (Data Source: Audit Analytics); 
Market Value of Equity - market value (in $MM) of equity at fiscal year-end (MKVALT) 
(Data Source: Compustat); 
Market-to-Book - market-to-book ratio, computed as market value of equity at fiscal year-end 
(MKVALT) divided by stockholders equity (CEQ) (Data Source: Compustat); 
Equity Return Volatility - standard deviation of daily returns during the year (Data Source: 
CRSP); 
Dividend Indicator  - equals one if the firm pays dividends (DVC) during the year and zero 
otherwise (Data Source: Compustat);  
Losses  - incidence of negative income before extraordinary items (IBT) realizations over the 
past five years (Data Source: Compustat); 
Return on Assets - income before extraordinary items (IBT) divided by total assets (AT) (Data 
Source: Compustat); 
Book Leverage - sum of short-term and long-term debt (DLC and DLTT, respectively) divided 
by total assets (Data Source: Compustat); 
Board Size – number of directors on the board (Data Source: RiskMetrics); 
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Independent Directors Ratio – number of independent directors divided by total number of 
directors (Data Source: RiskMetrics); 
Proportion of Busy Directors – number of independent directors who serve on more than one 
board of directors divided by total number of directors (Data Source: RiskMetrics); 
Busy Board Indicator – equals one if the Proportion of Busy Directors is greater than 50% 
(Data Source: RiskMetrics); 
CEO Chairman of the Board Indicator – equals one if the CEO is the chairman of the board 
and zero otherwise (Data Source: RiskMetrics); 
Mean Directors Tenure – average tenure of independent directors (Data Source: RiskMetrics); 
Mean Directors Age – average age of independent directors (Data Source: RiskMetrics); 
Director Ownership – total number of shares held by independent directors divided by number 
of shares outstanding (Data Source: RiskMetrics); 
Number of Directors who are CEO – number of independent directors who serve as CEO of 
another firm (Data Source: RiskMetrics). 
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Table 1: Reputation and Director Characteristics 
 
 
 
Zero 
Reputation 
(n=63,022) 
Positive 
Reputation 
(n=29,251) Difference 
Director Reputation 0 26,639 26,639*** 
Number of Boards 1.000 2.448 1.448*** 
Director Age 60.874 61.726 0.852*** 
Female  0.119 0.141 0.022*** 
Audit Committee Member 0.583 0.531 -0.051*** 
Audit Committee Chair 0.168 0.169 0.001 
Compensation Committee Member 0.543 0.562 0.020*** 
Compensation Committee Chair 0.159 0.180 0.022*** 
Employment – CEO 0.143 0.260 0.116*** 
Employment – Chairman of Board 0.121 0.241 0.120*** 
Employment – CFO 0.023 0.010 -0.013*** 
Board Meeting Attendance<75% 0.022 0.025 0.004*** 
 
 
The table shows mean director characteristics for directors with zero and positive reputation. Director 
Reputation is measured as the sum of the market values of all other public companies in which the 
director serves. Female is an indicator variable that equals one if the director is female, and zero 
otherwise. Audit Committee Member (Chair) takes the value of one if the director is a member (the chair) 
of the audit committee and zero otherwise. Compensation Committee Member (Chair) is defined similarly 
with respect to the compensation committee. Employment – CEO, Employment – Chairman of Board, 
and Employment – CFO are indicator variables that equal one if the director serves as CEO, Chairman of 
the Board, or CFO of another firm, respectively, and zero otherwise. Board Meeting Attendance<75% is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the director attended less than 75% of the board meetings, and zero 
otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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Table 2: Firm-Level Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Firm-Level Variables  
 
Mean Q1 Median Q3 Sum 
Mean Board Reputation 7,824 76 1,287 7,048 
  
Financial Reporting Quality: 
Accruals Quality 0.036 0.018 0.028 0.046 
 Discretionary Accruals 0.039 0.012 0.027 0.052 
 Restatement Indicator 0.104 0 0 0 607 
Effective Internal Controls Indicator 0.939 1 1 1 2992 
 
Firm Characteristics: 
     Market Value of Equity 8,320 701 1,701 5,295 
 Market-to-Book 3.025 1.564 2.301 3.557 
 Equity Return Volatility 0.028 0.019 0.025 0.034 
 Dividend Indicator 0.521 0 1 1 3032 
Losses 0.693 0 0 1 4032 
Return on Assets 0.045 0.021 0.054 0.091 
 Book Leverage 0.204 0.056 0.200 0.310 
  
Board Characteristics: 
Board Size 8.973 7 9 10 
 Independent Directors Ratio 0.722 0.625 0.750 0.846 
 Proportion of Busy Directors 0.307 0.125 0.286 0.500 
 Busy Board Indicator 0.188 0 0 0 1092 
CEO Chairman of the Board Indicator 0.575 0 1 1 3344 
Director Ownership 0.013 0.001 0.004 0.009 
 Number of Directors who are CEOs 0.896 0 1 1 5208 
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Panel B: Mean Variables by High/Low Mean Board Reputation 
 
Zero Board 
Reputation 
(n=1,342) 
Positive Board 
Reputation 
(n=4,472) Difference 
Mean Board Reputation 0 10,173 10,172*** 
 
Financial Reporting Quality: 
Accruals Quality 0.043 0.034 -0.008*** 
Discretionary Accruals 0.044 0.038 -0.006*** 
Restatement Indicator 0.117 0.101 -0.016*** 
Effective Internal Controls Indicator 0.911 0.945 0.034 
 
Firm Characteristics: 
   Market Value of Equity 6.746 7.874 1.128*** 
Market-to-Book 2.716 3.118 0.402*** 
Equity Return Volatility 0.032 0.027 -0.005*** 
Dividend Indicator 0.334 0.578 0.244*** 
Losses 0.808 0.659 -0.149*** 
Return on Assets 0.043 0.045 0.002*** 
Book Leverage 0.164 0.216 0.053*** 
 
Board Characteristics: 
Board Size 7.668 9.364 1.697*** 
Independent Directors Ratio 0.627 0.750 0.124*** 
Proportion of Busy Directors 0.000 0.399 0.399*** 
Busy Board Indicator 0.000 0.244 0.244*** 
CEO Chairman of the Board Indicator 0.527 0.590 0.063*** 
Director Ownership 0.014 0.013 0.000** 
Number of Directors who are CEOs 0.451 1.029 0.578*** 
 
 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the sample firms; Panel B shows the mean of firm and board 
characteristics for firms with zero and positive board reputation. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 3:  Directors Joining the Firm 
 
 
Panel A: Mean Firm and Board Characteristics for Zero and Positive “New” Board 
Reputation 
 
 
New 
Reputation>0 
New 
Reputation=0 Difference 
 
n=930 n=1421 
 Accruals Quality 0.034 0.037 -0.003*** 
Discretionary Accruals 0.037 0.040 -0.003 
Log Market Value of Equity 8.309 7.522 0.787*** 
Market-to-Book 3.308 3.052 0.256** 
Equity Return Volatility 0.024 0.027 -0.003*** 
Dividend Indicator 0.646 0.512 0.134*** 
Losses 0.590 0.716 -0.125*** 
Return on Assets 0.055 0.047 0.008** 
Book Leverage 0.225 0.207 0.019*** 
Board Size 9.541 8.787 0.754*** 
Independent Directors Ratio 0.726 0.699 0.027*** 
Busy Board Indicator 0.302 0.172 0.130*** 
CEO Chairman of the Board Indicator 0.626 0.569 0.057*** 
Director Ownership 0.010 0.013 -0.003** 
Number of Directors who are CEOs 1.086 0.866 0.220*** 
Log Board Reputation 7.405 5.850 1.555*** 
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Panel B: Determinants of the Decision to Join Company 
 
 Accrual Quality Measure 
 Accruals 
Quality 
Accruals 
Quality 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -9.619*** -9.526*** -9.415*** -9.582*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log Market Value of Equity 1.313*** 1.324*** 1.300*** 1.320*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book -0.114 -0.121 -0.109 -0.108 
 (0.168) (0.145) (0.187) (0.189) 
Equity Return Volatility -87.72*** -96.94*** -82.97*** -92.12*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.0012) 
Dividend Indicator 0.158 0.209 0.142 0.166 
 (0.762) (0.689) (0.785) (0.749) 
Losses 0.253 0.205 0.328 0.290 
 (0.319) (0.475) (0.188) (0.265) 
Return on Assets -1.528 -1.692 -1.533 -1.641 
 (0.619) (0.581) (0.618) (0.593) 
Book Leverage 0.170 0.288 -0.0759 0.0364 
 (0.908) (0.846) (0.958) (0.980) 
Accruals Measure 
13.80  4.407  
(0.128)  (0.384)  
Discretionary Component 
 15.44  2.482 
 (0.112)  (0.664) 
Innate Component  22.68  14.43 
  (0.262)  (0.417) 
Board Size 0.131 0.122 0.121 0.109 
 (0.276) (0.311) (0.312) (0.365) 
Independent Directors Ratio 0.976 0.643 1.187 0.826 
 (0.546) (0.693) (0.461) (0.612) 
Busy Board Indicator 0.705 0.607 0.698 0.611 
 (0.204) (0.276) (0.209) (0.273) 
CEO Chairman of the Board Indicator 0.345 0.418 0.355 0.408 
 (0.435) (0.345) (0.422) (0.357) 
Director Ownership -5.608 -3.094 -5.295 -2.814 
 (0.392) (0.652) (0.420) (0.682) 
Number of Directors who are CEOs -0.146 -0.145 -0.163 -0.153 
 (0.516) (0.521) (0.469) (0.498) 
Log Board Reputation 
0.291*** 0.307*** 0.294*** 0.309*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.035 
Observations 2351 2330 2351 2330 
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Panel A shows the mean of firm and board characteristics for firms with new directors whose reputation 
is zero compared to firms with new directors whose reputation is greater than zero. Panel B presents Tobit 
regression results where the dependent variable is the log of (1+New Reputation), which is computed as 
the mean reputation of new directors joining the company. The independent variables are lagged one year.  
 
The Accruals Measure in Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) is Accruals Quality (Performance-Matched 
Discretionary Accruals). The Discretionary Component (Innate Component) is the residual (predicted 
value) from a regression of the Accruals Measure on factors that have been shown to affect innate 
earnings quality. These factors include size (log of market value of equity), market-to-book, standard 
deviation of operating cash flows and standard deviation of total sales scaled by total assets, both 
computed based on the most recent 5 years, operating cycle, which is measured as the sum of inventory 
and accounts receivable days, and industry fixed effects.  
 
Two-tailed p-values are in parentheses. The regressions are estimated using Tobit. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
. 
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Table 4: Change in Monitoring Following Real Changes in Board Reputation 
 
Panel A: Mean Variables by Change in Board Reputation 
 
 
ΔReputation<0 ΔReputation =0 ΔReputation >0 Difference 
 
n=565 n=1498 n=812 Positive-Negative 
Change in Reputation -44,201 0 31,375 
 Accruals Quality 0.031 0.038 0.034 0.003** 
Discretionary Accruals 0.035 0.040 0.038 0.004 
Log Market Value of Equity 8.243 7.459 8.216 -0.027 
Market-to-Book 3.150 3.016 3.281 0.131 
Equity Return Volatility 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.000 
Dividend Indicator 0.681 0.487 0.622 -0.059** 
Losses 0.646 0.740 0.600 -0.046 
Return on Assets 0.049 0.045 0.055 0.006 
Book Leverage 0.228 0.201 0.223 -0.005 
Board Size 10.170 8.774 9.399 -0.771*** 
Independent Directors Ratio 0.775 0.699 0.717 -0.059*** 
Busy Board Indicator 0.434 0.128 0.267 -0.166*** 
CEO Chairman of the Board 
Indicator 0.635 0.561 0.626 -0.010 
Director Ownership 0.013 0.013 0.011 -0.003 
Number of Directors who are 
CEOs 1.308 0.803 1.073 -0.235*** 
Log Board Reputation 8.815 5.468 7.091 -1.724*** 
Annual Return 0.053 0.091 0.086 0.033 
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Panel B: Change in Monitoring Following Change in Board Reputation 
 
 
ΔReputation <0 ΔReputation =0 ΔReputation >0 
 
Pre Post Post-Pre Pre Post Post-Pre Pre Post Post-Pre 
Accruals Quality -0.003 -0.004 -0.002* -0.003 0.000 0.003*** -0.001 -0.003 -0.002* 
Discretionary Accruals 0.000 -0.004 -0.004*** -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.004** 
Restatement -0.011 0.001 0.012 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.031 0.000 -0.031** 
Effective Internal Controls 
Indicator 0.019 0.006 -0.013 -0.005 -0.002 0.003 -0.029 0.011 0.041** 
 
 
 
Panel C: Change in Monitoring Following New Reputation 
 
 
New_Reput=0 New_Reput>0 
 
Pre Post Post-Pre Pre Post Post-Pre 
Accruals Quality -0.002 0.000 0.002* -0.001 -0.003 -0.002* 
Discretionary Accruals 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.003* 
Restatement 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.021 0.000 -0.021* 
Effective Internal Controls Indicator -0.025 -0.002 0.023 -0.024 0.011 0.035** 
 
Panel A shows the mean of firm and board characteristics for groups formed on the basis of a change in 
reputation, which is computed as the sum of the reputations of directors that joined the company during 
the year minus the sum of the reputations of directors that left the company during the year. Annual return 
is the change in share price during the calendar year. Panel B shows the change in monitoring proxies for 
companies that experience a negative, zero, and positive change in reputation. The monitoring proxies in 
this panel are demeaned and de-trended. Panel C replicate the analysis in Panel B for companies with new 
directors whose reputation is zero and firms with new directors whose reputation is greater than zero.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
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Table 5: Change in Monitoring Following Change in Listing Requirements 
 
Panel A: Mean of Selected Variables for Compliant and Non-Compliant firms 
 
 
Number of 
Outside 
Directors 
2002 
Number of 
Outside 
Directors 
2005 
Proportion 
of Outside 
Directors 
2002 
Proportion 
of Outside 
Directors 
2005 
Mean 
Board 
Reputation 
2002 
Mean 
Board 
Reputation 
2005 
Compliant (N=395) 6.592 6.851 0.714 0.736 6.287 6.666 
Non-Compliant (N=69) 3.609 5.551 0.436 0.662 3.245 5.013 
 
 
Panel B: Regressions of Earnings Quality Proxies on Change in Reputation 
 
 Accruals 
Quality 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Constant 1.517* 5.134** (0.082) (0.024) 
Log Market Value of Equity -0.237*** -0.150* (0.000) (0.051) 
Market-to-Book 0.066** 0.177*** (0.026) (0.004) 
Operating Cycle 0.509*** 0.088 (0.003) (0.674) 
Losses 0.145 -0.215* (0.122) (0.056) 
σ(operating cash flowst,t-4) 
22.463*** 21.240*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
σ(Salest,t-4) 
2.142*** 2.408*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Mean Board Reputation -0.035 -0.048* (0.104) (0.079) 
Change in Mean Board Reputation 0.022 -0.040 (0.583) (0.529) 
Non-Compliant (02) -0.161 -0.245 (0.597) (0.489) 
Dummy Period (03-05) 0.057 -0.662*** (0.600) (0.001) 
Non-Compliant (00-02)*Dummy Period (03-05) 0.105 0.077 (0.755) (0.866) 
Dummy Period (03-05)*Change in Mean Board 
Reputation 
0.022 0.149* 
(0.610) (0.079) 
Non-Compliant (00-02)*Dummy Period (03-
05)*Change in Mean Board Reputation 
-0.120* -0.221** 
(0.088) (0.017) 
   
Observations 2,586 2,586 
R-squared 0.427 0.135 
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Panel A presents the mean of the number and proportion of outside directors in 2002 and 2005, as well as 
the change in mean board reputation from 2002 to 2005, for the sample of compliant and non-compliant 
firms. N is the number of firms. Panel B shows regressions of Accruals Quality and Discretionary 
Accruals on factors that have been shown to affect innate earnings quality and board reputation. 
σ(operating cash flowst,t-4) and σ(Salest,t-4) are the standard deviation of operating cash flows and total 
sales scaled by total assets, respectively, over the most recent 5 years; Operating Cycle is measured as the 
sum of inventory and accounts receivable days. Change in Mean Board Reputation is the difference 
between mean board reputation in 2005 and 2002. Non_Compliant (02) is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the firm did not have a majority of independent directors on the board in 2002 and zero otherwise. 
Dummy Period (03-05) is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is in the 2003-2005 period. 
Two-tailed p-values are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated using OLS including with robust 
standard errors corrected for firm clustering. The regressions control for industry (Fama-French 1997) 
fixed effect. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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Table 6: The Relation between Earnings Quality and Board Reputation 
 
Panel A: OLS Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable Accruals Quality Discretionary Accruals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 1.191 1.242 1.067 1.129 1.976** 1.987** 1.904** 1.914** 
 (0.138) (0.124) (0.181) (0.158) (0.039) (0.037) (0.048) (0.045) 
Log Market Value of 
Equity 
-0.224*** -0.231*** -0.208*** -0.219*** -0.145*** -0.147*** -0.148*** -0.150*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Market-to-Book 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Cycle 0.531*** 0.530*** 0.532*** 0.531*** 0.357** 0.357** 0.359** 0.358** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) 
Losses 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.195*** 0.194*** -0.055 -0.055 -0.055 -0.055 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.501) (0.500) (0.496) (0.494) 
σ(operating cash flowst,t-4) 18.267*** 18.269*** 18.211*** 18.204*** 16.514*** 16.514*** 16.456*** 16.454*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
σ(Salest,t-4) 2.764*** 2.761*** 2.781*** 2.783*** 3.709*** 3.709*** 3.743*** 3.744*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Busy Board Indicator  0.112  0.166  0.024  0.028 
  (0.312)  (0.124)  (0.874)  (0.849) 
Mean Board Reputation -0.021 -0.024   -0.032* -0.033*   
 (0.166) (0.108)   (0.077) (0.081)   
High Board Reputation    -0.268*** -0.311***   -0.239* -0.246* 
   (0.009) (0.002)   (0.053) (0.055) 
         
Observations 5,783 5,783 5,783 5,783 5,783 5,783 5,783 5,783 
R-squared 0.386 0.386 0.387 0.387 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126 
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Panel B: 3SLS Analysis – Relation between Reputation and Predicted Earnings Quality 
 
 (1) (2) 
Constant -7.606*** -7.756*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log Market Value of Equity 0.762*** 0.769*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book -0.027 -0.033 
 (0.191) (0.130) 
Equity Return Volatility 0.795 0.277 
 (0.818) (0.937) 
Dividend Indicator 0.275* 0.277* 
 (0.068) (0.065) 
Losses 0.037 0.036 
 (0.539) (0.522) 
Return on Assets -1.769*** -1.725*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Book Leverage 0.706* 0.729* 
 (0.073) (0.062) 
Predicted Accruals Quality 0.010  
 (0.808)  
Predicted Discretionary Accruals  0.034 
  (0.424) 
Board Size 0.264*** 0.265*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Independent Directors Ratio 5.965*** 5.986*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Busy Board Indicator 1.208*** 1.213*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Chairman of the Board Indicator 0.018 0.019 
 (0.851) (0.839) 
Director Ownership -2.182 -2.174 
 (0.168) (0.169) 
Number of Directors who are CEOs 0.114** 0.112** 
 (0.013) (0.014) 
   
Observations 5,783 5,783 
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Panel C: 3SLS Analysis – Relation between Earnings Quality and Predicted Reputation 
 
Dependent Variable Accrual Quality Discretionary 
Accruals 
Constant 1.227 1.804* 
 (0.131) (0.058) 
Log Market Value of Equity -0.228*** -0.052 
 (0.001) (0.503) 
Market-to-Book 0.057** 0.142*** 
 (0.012) (0.000) 
Operating Cycle 0.527*** 0.335** 
 (0.000) (0.047) 
Losses 0.189*** -0.042 
 (0.004) (0.610) 
σ(operating cash flowst,t-4) 18.254*** 16.499*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
σ(Salest,t-4) 2.773*** 3.654*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Busy Board Indicator 0.088 0.149 
 (0.515) (0.402) 
Predicted Mean Board Reputation -0.024 -0.120** 
 (0.612) (0.038) 
   
Observations 5,783 5,783 
R-squared 0.385 0.126 
 
Panel A shows regressions of Accruals Quality and Discretionary Accruals on factors that have been 
shown to affect innate earnings quality and board reputation. All variables are as defined before.  
 
Panels B and C report the coefficient estimates and p-values from estimating 3SLS regressions. Panel B 
shows the regression of mean board reputation on firm and board characteristics and the predicted values 
of Accruals Quality and Discretionary Accruals; Panel C provides the parameter estimates of regressions 
of Accruals Quality and Discretionary Accruals on the factors that affect innate earnings quality and the 
predicted value of Mean Board Reputation.   
 
Two-tailed p-values are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard 
errors corrected for firm clustering. The regressions include industry and year fixed effects. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
